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Chapter 2:
Legal Issues Relating to 
Conditions of Confinement for 
Youth in Adult Facilities

Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails.
A National Assessment
By James Austin Ph.D.
Kelly Dedel Johnson, Ph.D.
Maria Gregoriou, M.A.
October 2000

GORSKI-CENAPS Web Publications (
Published On: June 10, 2001          Updated On: August 07, 2001
© Terence T. Gorski, 2001

Chapter 2 Contents


Issue Arising In Institutional Litigation

State Statutes & Juvenile Transfer Law

Case Law Citations


Youth detained in adult facilities under criminal court jurisdiction have the right to humane treatment, mental health and medical care, education, due process protection, and access to their families and the courts. These rights extend to children who are confined in juvenile detention centers, training schools, adult jails and prisons, and other secure institutions. These rights emanate from the U.S. Constitution and federal laws, including the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act; from state constitutions and laws; and from court interpretations of these laws. This chapter provides a summary of the major legal cases that guide the care of juveniles in correctional facilities. Full citations of the cases mentioned in text can be found at the end of the chapter. (The chapter was adapted for this report from Chapter 2 of Representing the Child Client, "Legal Rights of the Child," by Mark Soler.) 

Conditions for convicted adult prisoners, and juveniles convicted under adult court jurisdiction only violate the U.S. Constitution where they amount to "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth amendment (see Rhodes v. Chapman). Adult facilities must provide for basic needs, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and protection from violence. To determine whether a particular condition or practice is cruel or unusual in an adult institution, courts evaluate:  (1) whether the condition poses a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) whether officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to the rights of the inmate (see Wilson v. Seiter and Farmer v. Brennan).

Youth may be entitled to additional protection under state laws or regulations. For example, most states have laws giving children a right to treatment and rehabilitation. In addition, many states have laws that require that children be placed in the least restrictive environment consistent with public safety needs or that prohibit the detention of children under juvenile court jurisdiction in adult facilities. Also, some states have laws or regulations setting standards for maximum inmate population sizes, building conditions, health and safety requirements, and programming mandates for facilities where children are detained.

The determination of whether a condition or practice violates the constitution or other laws depends on the particular case and the specific legal issue raised. Cases do not have identical circumstances. Thus, to assess the risk of lawsuits, correctional authorities must be knowledgeable about the cases most analogous to their situation and must realize that slight differences in facts could change the ruling. For this reason, the case law citations included in this overview as a starting point for research should not be taken as the definitive authority for cases involving similar issues. Also, this overview provides citations only to published cases-that is, cases appearing in the official court reports. 

Many issues considered here have also been taken up by:

·          the American Bar Association Standards on Interim Status,

·          American Correctional Association Standards for Juvenile Correctional Facilities,

·          National Commission on Correctional Health Care Standards, and

·          U.S. Department of Justice Standards for the Administration of Juvenile Justice.

Professional standards reflect the collective wisdom of professionals in the field, and courts often use them as a guide for determining whether laws have been violated.  Complying with professional standards, however, does not insulate facilities from liability. Many facilities have been successfully sued, even though they complied with the standards of a professional organization. This situation may occur when the standards do not address a particular issue or when the standards require only that there be an institutional policy on the issue without specifying its contents. The shortcomings of many commonly used standards prompted the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to call for the development of performance-based standards that specify the outcomes facilities should achieve (Parent and Leiter, 1994).

The constitutional standard for measuring violations under the due process clause, commonly used for children and pretrial detainees, is whether the detainees are being held under conditions that "amount to punishment" (see Gary H. v. Hegstrom and Bell v. Wolfish). These standards give more protection to children than would be afforded to convicted adult prisoners under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. In adult prison cases, inmates must show that the deprivation was sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in that it involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and that the official acted with "deliberate indifference" (see Wilson v. Seiter and Farmer v. Brennan). The due process clause is a less rigorous standard and broadens the rights of juveniles. 

This overview focuses primarily on federal civil rights litigation. State laws may create additional liabilities, eliminate certain defenses (such as immunity) for defendants, and determine who will be reimbursed or indemnified in damage cases. For example, lawsuits may be filed under state tort law or other specific statutes such as the federal Individuals With Disabilities Education Act. 

Issues Arising in Institutional Litigation

The remainder of this overview discusses the numerous issues that commonly arise in institutional litigation on behalf of confined youth. Together the issues can be referred to using the acronym CHAPTERS. This acronym is an easy way to remember the following eight major areas of institutional considerations:

·          Classification and separation issues.
·          Health and mental health care. |
·          Access to counsel, the courts, and family members.
·          Programming, education, and recreation.
·          Training and supervision of institutional staff.
·          Environment, sanitation, overcrowding, and privacy.
·          Restraints, isolation, punishment, and due process.
·          Safety issues for staff and confined youth.

Classification & Separation

Litigation on classification issues has addressed the separation of, or failure to separate, adult and juvenile inmates under a number of conditions, including segregation of violent or aggressive adult inmates, separation by age (e.g., the JJDPA sight and sound separation requirements), improper separation by gender or race, and separation of inmates with infectious diseases.

Separation of individuals with violent propensities. Much of the case law on classification involves claims by young or vulnerable adult inmates who were physically or sexually assaulted by inmates known to be criminally sophisticated, dangerous, violent, or aggressive. Adult inmates have the right to be protected from the threat of violence and sexual assault. If officials know of an inmate's vulnerability, they have an obligation not to act with deliberate or reckless indifference to that vulnerability. Counties or supervisory officials, as well as institutional staff, may be liable if their policies or customs (e.g., on jail overcrowding or handling of particular categories of inmates) amount to deliberate indifference to inmates' security needs (see Smith v. Wade, Withers v. Levine, Woodhouse v. Virginia, Stokes v. Delcambre, Nelson v. Overberg, Redman v. County of San Diego, and Hale v. Tallapoosa County).

The same principles apply to incarcerated youth who have the right to be free from unreasonable threats to their physical safety. Facilities must have a system for screening and separating aggressive juveniles from more passive ones and for determining appropriate levels of institutional classification (see Alexander S. v. Boyd). The failure to protect children from the sexual aggressiveness of other confined juveniles may result in liability (see Guidry v. Rapides Parish School Board). 

Sight and sound separation/removal of children from adult jails/deinstitutionalization of status offenders:  JJDPA requires sight and sound separation of juveniles held under state juvenile court jurisdiction (and juveniles younger than age 18 under federal court jurisdiction) from adults in jails and lockups. The act does not apply to youth in adult facilities who are being prosecuted as adults in state court. In many adult facilities, impermissible contacts occur during admission to the facility, transportation to court, mealtime, and cleaning of living units.

Ironically, jails that separate juveniles from adults may run afoul of other constitutional protections because juveniles are typically isolated for long periods, without access to institutional programs and services. This situation led Congress to amend the act in 1980. Thus, federal regulations permit delinquent children to be held in lockups for only a limited number of hours before and after court hearings. 

Separation by gender. Classification and separation of adult inmates may not be used to justify unequal program opportunities for one gender. Thus, educational, recreational, and vocational training programs for female inmates must be equivalent to those available to males (see Glover v. Johnson, Mitchell v. Untreiner, Cantarino v.Wilson, and Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. District of Columbia). Compliance with this requirement is often a problem in institutions that house more men than women and that do not adequately provide for females' participation in courses, work opportunities, and recreational programs. Similar situations arise in juvenile facilities housing both female and male youth.

Separation by race. Classification, housing assignments, and job assignments that result in patterns of racial disparity may violate the 14th amendment (see Santiago v. Miles). Although facilities may take racial tensions into account when maintaining security, discipline, and order, they may not simply segregate the populations based on race (see Lee v. Washington, Jones v. Diamond, and White v. Morris).

Segregation of inmates for health reasons.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that, at the end of 1994, approximately 2.4 percent of male inmates and 3.9 percent of female inmates in adult correctional facilities were HIV positive. There are limited statistical data on the numbers of confined youth who are HIV positive, but the incidence of high-risk, unprotected sexual activity and intravenous drug use suggests that the rate may be even higher for detained youth. 

Not surprisingly, a growing interest in classification litigation involves the treatment of inmates who are HIV positive. Issues commonly litigated include segregation (specifically the right to equivalent programming, access to the outside world, and services if segregated), mandatory testing, confidentiality, and medical treatment for HIV/AIDS (see Harris v. Thigpen and Anderson v. Romero). 

Although existing case law helps to describe the relevant issues relating to HIV/AIDS, the decisions from various jurisdictions are inconsistent (compare Camarillo v. McCarthy and Moore v. Mabus, which found that segregation of inmates who are HIV positive violates the constitution; and Zaczek v. Murray, which affirmed a lower court holding that segregation and mandatory testing are not required by the constitution, with Doe v. Coughlin, which found that segregation of inmates who are HIV positive violates constitutional privacy rights). Soler (1993) offers a discussion of recent case law. To some degree, these decisions reflect the evolving state of medical knowledge on the treatment of HIV/AIDS and corresponding changes in public health policy about confidentiality, testing, and practices for reducing the risk of transmission. Juvenile detention centers must have thoughtful policies on all aspects of confining persons who may be HIV positive.


Medical and dental care. Inmates are constitutionally entitled to medical care, including both screening and direct service. Institutions may not interfere with access to medical care or interfere with prescribed treatment for illness. Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of adult inmates violates the eighth amendment (see Estelle v. Gamble and Boretti v. Wiscomb). For example, the medical care system violated constitutional standards in Ramos v. Lamm, in which there were fewer than 10 hours per week of onsite physician care for an entire prison, overuse of physicians' substitutes, and use of inmates to deliver medical services. Budgetary constraints may not be used to justify a denial of necessary medical care (see Jones v. Johnson). Similarly, a substantial delay in medical treatment may result in a finding that medical care was constitutionally inadequate (see Durmer v. O'Carroll).

Each facility should have a screening mechanism for inmates. The screening should be done by a doctor or another professional who has had medical training. Many jails and lockups have a nonmedical person performing this task. This situation is not satisfactory and may result in a medical tragedy. Also, someone on staff must have the authority to transfer a seriously ill inmate to another medical facility (see Colle v. Brazos County, Texas).

In addition to screening, facilities must provide adequate medical services and access to medical supplies such as eyeglasses (Williams v. I.C.C. Committee), prescription medicines (Gerakeris v. Champagne), wheelchairs (Weeks v. Chaboudy), special diets (Coades v. Jeffes), and dental care (Boyd v. Knox). In the adult system, cases have involved health-related claims that facilities have failed to make reasonable modifications to serve inmates with disabilities pursuant to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 and claims that inmates have been denied the benefits of institutional programs because of a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Mental health care.  Children and adult inmates are constitutionally entitled to adequate mental health care. For the components of a minimally adequate mental health system see Ruiz v. Estelle. Ramos v. Lamm found that mental health services in an adult prison were grossly inadequate where 5 to 10 percent of inmates were mentally ill and 10 to 25 percent needed mental health treatment; a psychiatrist visited the prison only twice in the year before trial, and there was a 2- to 5-week wait for services from mental health staff. Similarly, Coleman v. Wilson found constitutional violations where a prison system failed to provide a systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates' mental health needs; a treatment program that involved more than segregation and close supervision of mentally ill inmates; access to a sufficient number of trained mental health professionals; maintenance of accurate, complete, and confidential mental health records; administration of psychotropic medication with appropriate supervision and periodic evaluation; and a basic program to identify, treat, and supervise inmates at risk for suicide (see Madrid v. Gomez for components of adequate institutional mental health services).

Many detained youth are mentally ill or suffer from severe emotional disturbances. Sometimes confinement adds to their disturbance. Therefore, facilities must screen minors for mental health problems, provide emergency psychological services, establish procedures for dealing with suicidal youngsters, make sure that medications are prescribed and administered by qualified medical personnel, establish provisions for children to request psychological care, and make sure that there is adequate staff for ongoing psychological services. 

Juvenile cases addressing mental health needs of detained children include Thomas v. Mears, Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, Morales v. Turman, Martarella v. Kelley, Morgan v. Sproat, and Ahrens v. Thomas. The use of drugs for behavior control is constitutionally prohibited (see Nelson v. Heyne and Pena v. New York State Division for Youth). Jackson v. Fort Stanton State Hospital & Training School includes a discussion of the Youngberg v. Romeo standard in relation to developmentally disabled adults.

Apart from cases involving general mental health care in institutions, there are cases involving suicides and other harm to prisoners based on the indifference of officials to known mental health needs. Many cases involve suicides. Buffington v. Baltimore City deals with the liability of two police officers who knew that a detainee was on the verge of suicide but failed to follow department policy for the care of suicidal inmates; Simmons v. City of Philadelphia addresses holding the city liable for indifference to the medical needs of an intoxicated adult detainee who committed suicide; Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi treats refusing qualified immunity to jail officials for placing a suicidal inmate in an isolated cell that was not visually monitored despite a recent suicide and failing to have onsite staff with a key who could open the door once the inmate was seen hanging; Heflin v. Stewart County, Tennessee holds that the jury should have been permitted to decide whether the jail staff's failure to cut down a hanging inmate until photos had been taken (when evidence suggested that the inmate may have been alive) was deliberate indifference; Hall v. Ryan reverses the dismissal of a case in which evidence suggested that the defendants knew of the inmate's suicidal condition because of past encounters with the police department or were recklessly indifferent in failing to consult his file after observing his wild behavior; and Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles holds that a county could be liable for deliberate indifference when its policy of understaffing institutional mental health services contributed to the suicide of an inmate placed in isolation after a suicide attempt.

Again, the suicide cases demonstrate the need for thorough mental health screening by trained staff, policies governing the supervision and treatment of suicidal and at-risk inmates, and the availability of mental health services, particularly for detained children.

Access To Others:

This issue refers to a minor's right of access to family members and important people in his or her life. It also refers to access to the legal system. Minors have a right to reasonable access, and the cases that have addressed this issue discuss the standard of reasonableness in particular situations. The rules on mail access are more specific. 

The experience of being incarcerated is traumatic for youth, particularly when placed in an adult facility. Youth need the emotional support of their family, and access to the community may be critical to the success of court intervention. Thus, in D.B. v. Tewksbury the court found that children confined in a jail were deprived of their constitutional rights when they were denied regular visits, use of the telephone, and mail services. The court found that these restrictions needlessly intensified children's fears and hostilities and were counterproductive to the goals of the juvenile justice system.

Visits. Institutions housing children must provide for reasonable visitation. Visits should be permitted during the day, with provisions for alternative visiting times for parents who are unable to visit during the normal hours. Approved visitors should include adult relatives, family friends, and siblings with approval from the minor's probation officer or counselor.

Unfortunately, punitive attitudes, understaffing, and limited visiting areas have restricted visiting opportunities for children. The right to reasonable visitation has been litigated in a number of juvenile cases, including Ahrens v. Thomas, Thomas v. Mears, Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, and D.B. v. Tewksbury. Visitation should not be curtailed because of overcrowding or staff shortages, according to Patchette v. Nix. 

Telephone access.  Case law does not set an absolute requirement for telephone use but insists a facility must provide reasonable access to telephones. Calls may be made to parents, relatives, and attorneys. Monitoring may occur only if justified. Limited staffing and few public telephones often result in undue restrictions on children's ability to make telephone calls from jails and lockups. Juvenile cases addressing telephone use include Gary W. v. State of Louisiana and Ahrens v. Thomas.

Mail access. There are two categories of mail: privileged and nonprivileged. Privileged mail is between the child and his or her attorney, a judge, a legislator, or some other public official and is usually designated as such (e.g., "legal mail") on the envelope. Privileged mail may not be opened by staff, except to inspect it for contraband according to Wolff v. McDonnell. Nonprivileged mail is all other mail and may be opened under certain circumstances to inspect for contraband or criminal activity. Even then, staff must have facts to support their suspicions. 

If mail is to be read, the individual must be given an opportunity to appeal to someone other than the person who suspects the correspondence (see Procunier v. Martinez). The U.S. Supreme Court has permitted only limited restrictions on inmate mail. Turner v. Safley addresses correspondence between adult inmates at different correctional institutions; Thornburgh v. Abbott deals with rejection of publications found detrimental to institutional security; and Ramos v. Lamm addresses a ruling that struck down prohibition of correspondence in another language in an institution where one-third of the institutional population was Hispanic. 

Access to the courts.  Correctional facilities must ensure that inmates have meaningful access to both counsel and the courts (see Younger v. Gilmore). In Bounds v. Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the provision of adequate libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law would meet the constitutional requirement and that facilities should explore various avenues such as volunteer or legal services attorneys, law students, inmate paralegals, or public defenders to meet this requirement. More recently, in Lewis v. Casey the Court explained that inmates require the tools to argue their sentences or to challenge the conditions of their confinement. The rights of illiterate or non-English-speaking inmates might necessitate the provision of special assistance. 

Earlier cases found constitutional violations where prison library systems imposed hurdles to access (see Toussaint v. McCarthy). Also, courts have held that prisons that offer paralegal assistance as an alternative to providing direct library access must provide trained legal assistants, and inmates must be supplied with a reasonable amount of office materials for court filing of documents (see Gluth v. Kangas, Knop v. Johnson, and Ward v. Kort). However, the Court emphasized, in Lewis v. Casey, that constitutional violations must be measured in relation to actual, not theoretical, injuries caused by the inadequacies of libraries or other legal assistance.

Unmonitored visits with attorneys must be allowed upon reasonable request. Keker v. Procunier and Adams v. Carlson address the duty of institutions to keep lines of communication open among inmates, attorneys, and the courts. The sixth amendment also includes the right of reasonable access to attorneys to challenge unlawful conditions and seek redress of constitutional rights under Procunier v. Martinez. Inmates must also be allowed to meet with attorneys on civil matters according to U.S. v. Janis and Corpus v. Estelle.


The U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly ruled on the right to treatment for juveniles, and lower court cases have ruled ambiguously on this issue. The Court has recognized a right to treatment for mentally retarded adults who, like children, are confined for treatment without their consent (see Youngberg v. Romeo). In addition, a number of courts have found a right to treatment in juvenile institutional cases. In Alexander S. v. Boyd, the court found a constitutional right to a minimally adequate level of programming designed to teach juveniles the principles essential to correct their behavior. 

Exercise and recreation.  Inmates are constitutionally entitled to fresh air and regular exercise (see Spain v. Procunier). In adult prisons, restriction to two 1-hour exercise periods per week has been held to violate the eighth amendment (see Sweet v. South Carolina and Spain v. Procunier). Where there is substantial access to indoor recreation areas, up to 18 hours per day, according to Clay v. Miller, there may be a finding of no violation, but such substantial alternatives often do not exist. Where the adult inmate is in disciplinary segregation, the institution must still explore ways to provide regular exercise and may restrict it only in exceptional circumstances (see Mitchell v. Rice).

Education/special education. The courts have made it clear that children in correctional facilities are entitled to the benefit of special education laws under Green v. Johnson and Donnell C. v. Illinois State Board of Education. Children eligible for special education are entitled to a broad range of assessment, evaluation, educational, and related services under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act. Federal time lines for assessment and implementation apply, even when the child is in temporary detention (see U.S. Office of Civil Rights, Solano County Juvenile Hall, California, Case No. 09-89-1227 and Nick O. v. Terhune). Institutions confining children must also refrain from discriminating against educationally handicapped children under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Religion.  Facilities housing children or adult inmates must accommodate religious observances. The traditional view was that religious practices must be allowed provided they did not jeopardize the security of the institution (see Cruz v. Beto). In recent years, the Court has taken a narrower view, holding that limitations on the exercise of religion are permissible if they are related to a legitimate penological objective (see O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz). However, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 appears to restore a higher standard of legal scrutiny. The government must show a "compelling interest" before impinging on religious practices and use the least restrictive means of regulation.

Work. Children may be required to clean their cells or living areas but cannot be forced to do chores for the personal benefit of staff or be exploited for their labor. Limited case law specifically relates to children on this issue, but the legal theory is clear. People who have not been convicted of a crime may not be punished under the due process principles articulated in Bell v. Wolfish. By analogy to the forced labor cases involving mentally ill patients, Johnson v. Cicone and Tyler v. Harris found that inappropriate work requirements may violate the 13th amendment or provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (see Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, Souder v. Brennan, Wyatt v. Stickney, and Wyatt v. Aderholt).


Over the past decade, courts have ruled on the liability of institutional administrators and supervisors for a wide range of conduct relating to the hiring, training, supervising, assigning, directing, and retaining of staff. Liability may be imposed if supervisors hire unqualified people, fail to train staff adequately, fail to supervise staff on the job, fail to provide staff with formal policy and procedural guidelines, or fail to fire unfit staff. These issues typically arise in cases where injuries or death have occurred and staff have not been trained to handle suicidal children or medical emergencies.

Failure to properly hire or train personnel may constitute indifference to the rights or safety of others and may support liability for punitive damages under Smith v. Wade. This case is particularly relevant where there is a governmental pattern of deliberate indifference resulting in injury to the plaintiff (see Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of Houston, Texas, and McKenna v. City of Memphis). The right to properly trained staff is well established. Thus, in Garrett v. Rader, where the plaintiff's developmentally disabled daughter died in restraints administered by untrained staff, the defendants were not permitted to claim qualified immunity.

Under City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, a failure to train employees may also form the basis for municipal liability in federal civil rights litigation. The issue is whether the training program is adequate and, if it is not, whether the inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent city policy. Thus, in Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, the city's policy or custom of not training its officers to deal with suicidal inmates amounted to deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical needs. Similarly, Gobel v. Maricopa County holds that a government entity may be liable for the failure to train properly its employees if there is a connection between the violation of civil rights and the inadequate training (see Davis v. Mason County and Young v. Augusta, Georgia).


Unsanitary and inhumane environmental conditions may violate inmates' rights under the 8th and 14th amendments (see Hoptowit v. Spellman, McCord v. Maggio, Jones v. Diamond, and Carver v. Knox County, Tennessee). Environmental issues may arise if children are housed in inadequate, dilapidated, or unhygienic physical surroundings (see Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck, Ahrens v. Thomas, and Thomas v. Mears).

Sanitation. There should be no sewage backup in sleeping quarters, and the area should be free of insects and rodents. The living area should be clean and comply with local and state sanitation regulations. Thus, Ramos v. Lamm found constitutional violations at a prison with poor ventilation, fungus and mold, poor drainage, sewage accumulation, rodent and insect infestation, missing tiles/hard-to-clean bathroom areas, exposed wiring, broken windows, inadequate laundry facilities, deteriorating conditions, and inadequate maintenance. Along the same line, McCord v. Maggio held that lack of funds was not a justification for requiring inmates to live in cells where sewage backup created squalid and unsanitary conditions.

Hygiene.  Children in custody should be provided with adequate supplies for personal hygiene and should be given an opportunity to shower daily, change their clothing reasonably often, and have fresh bed linens on a weekly basis under Ahrens v. Thomas and Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck.

Food.  Institutions housing children must provide a balanced diet, with three meals each day and snacks at night. Food should be prepared in accord with public health standards. Food should not be old or moldy; there should not be evidence of insects, rodents, or bad sanitation; and inmate workers should be trained in food preparation and storage (see Ramos v. Lamm). Food should never be withheld from children for disciplinary reasons (see Ahrens v. Thomas and Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck).

Ventilation, heating, and cooling.  Housing inmates in units with inadequate ventilation and air flow is unconstitutional according to Hopowit v. Spellman and Brock v. Warren County, Tennessee. Inadequate ventilation, heating, and cooling may violate inmates' constitutional right to adequate shelter under Ramos v. Lamm, Ahrens v. Thomas, Henderson v. De Robertis, and Del Raine v. Williford. The Court has also recognized that involuntary exposure to unreasonable environmental tobacco smoke may violate the constitution (see Helling v. McKinney).

Fire safety. This is a critical area since failure to adequately provide for fire safety may be a matter of life or death (see Hopowit v. Spellman). The facility must have smoke-monitoring devices, a written evacuation plan with posted diagrams for inmates and staff, at least two fire escape routes, fire extinguishers, and lights marking the fire exits (see Ahrens v. Thomas).

Lighting. The courts have not required specific levels of candle power, but professional standards require that lighting be sufficient for detainees to comfortably read books in their cells without eyestrain (see Hopowit v. Spellman, Ramos v. Lamm, McCord v. Maggio, and Jones v. Diamond). Juvenile cases addressing lighting include Ahrens v. Thomas and Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck.

Clothing/personal appearance. Children have a right to clean clothing under Inmates of Boys Training School v.Affleck. Clothing should be appropriate for the season, and children should be able to wear clothing similar to that worn by children in the community (see Thomas v. Mears). Also, restrictions on personal appearance that are unrelated to penological interests may violate prisoners' privacy rights (see Quinn v. Nix on striking down a prohibition on shag hairstyles).

Overcrowding. This is a critical issue because it is related to so many others. The effects of overcrowding permeate every aspect of institutional operation, including health issues, education, suicidal and assaultive behavior, and overreliance on restraints and disciplinary measures. Under the constitutional standard, the due process clause is violated where children are held under conditions that amount to punishment (see Gary H. v. Hegstrom and Bell v. Wolfish). 

In measuring overcrowding against constitutional standards, the courts look not  at overcrowding per se but at its impact upon conditions in the institution. Rhodes v. Chapman stands for the proposition that double- celling itself is not unconstitutional but that it is a factor to be taken into account with other prison conditions affecting essential needs (see Wilson v. Seiter). Thus, in Nami v. Fauver juveniles in the administrative segregation unit of a youth correctional facility could claim constitutional violations when they were double-celled in poorly ventilated, 80-square-foot rooms with only one bed, with violent or psychologically disturbed felons who abused them. Similarly, in Hall v. Dalton the court found constitutional inadequacies in a city jail where an adult inmate spent 40 days in a windowless, two-person cell that held four, with only 14 square feet per person, where meals were served in the cells, where there was little opportunity for exercise, and where the inmates had to sleep on the floor (see the additional adult cases of Tillery v. Owens, Balla v. Board of Corrections, Fisher v. Koehler, Baker v. Holden, Feliciano v. Colon, Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, Young v. Keohane, and Williams v. Griffin). 

There is also case law on overcrowding-related issues such as sleeping conditions. Several cases specifically hold that assigning pretrial detainees to sleep on mattresses on the floor violates the due process clause (see Lareau v. Manson, Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, and Lyons v. Powell). Similarly, courts have ruled on overcrowding in juvenile facilities as it relates to program effectiveness, physical plant, staff, security, and other conditions of confinement (see Alexander S. v. Boyd and A.J. v. Kierst). Where overpopulation has an impact upon the availability of health and mental health services, educational programs, and recreation; institutional violence; suicide attempts; and situations requiring the use of force or restraints, the courts may find a violation of the 14th amendment. In addition, courts may find that the constitution is violated where overpopulation means that children spend most of their waking hours locked in their rooms because of inadequate staff to supervise day rooms or recreational activities.

Courts around the country have imposed population caps to alleviate overcrowding, even when officials claimed that overcrowding was a result of budgetary constraints (see Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas). In a recent juvenile institutional case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ordered that no juvenile detention facilities may accept children beyond their licensed capacity, no child may be held in detention longer than 30 days pending disposition of his or her case, and no child may be held longer than 14 days pending postdisposition placement in an appropriate setting. In addition, the court ordered that detention centers must adopt modified versions of the American Bar Association's detention standards at intake (see Facilities Review Panel v. Coe).

The Prison Reform Litigation Act of 1995 limits the permissible remedies in cases involving prison conditions and imposes special requirements on prisoner release orders. Nonetheless, relief may still be granted to remedy overcrowding, consistent with the provisions of the act. 

Searches. Incarcerated individuals retain some privacy rights. In Bell v. Wolfish, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a determination of whether body cavity searches may be conducted requires balancing the need for a particular search with the invasion of personal rights. For example, adult inmates are entitled to some protection against exposure of their genitals to persons of the opposite gender (see Arey v. Robinson, Lee v. Downs, and Hayes v. Marriott). Similarly, random, suspicionless, clothed searches of female inmates have been found unconstitutional in Jordan v. Gardner. Also, blanket policies allowing strip searches of all detained persons represent an unconstitutional intrusion into personal rights (see Chapman v. Nichols, Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, Giles v. Ackerman, Ward v. County of San Diego, and Thompson v. Souza on recognizing qualified immunity of officials for visual body cavity searches and urine tests of prisoners preselected for prior drug involvement and Thompson v. City of Los Angeles on holding that grand theft auto is sufficiently associated with violence to justify a strip search based on the charge itself). 

Courts have remained protective in cross-gender searches of female inmates, disapproving practices such as random, clothed body searches of female inmates by male guards in Jordan v. Gardner and body cavity searches of females in the presence of male officers in Bonitz v. Fair. Even patdown searches of male inmates by female staff violates inmate rights if improperly conducted (see Watson v. Jones). In some situations, male inmates enjoy fewer protections than females. The courts have recognized that female guards may conduct visual body cavity searches of male inmates, and may supervise male prisoners disrobing, showering, and using the toilets under Grummet v. Rushen, Somers v. Thorman, and Johnson v. Phelan.


Mechanical restraints. Facilities vary in their use of mechanical restraints. Most juvenile facilities use handcuffs, but the use of four-point restraints or straitjackets is rare. In some facilities, a high incidence of restraint incidents results from inadequate staff training and overcrowding. In others, restraints are used to control mentally ill children or adult inmates or as a punitive measure for troublesome youth.

Freedom from bodily restraint is a protected liberty under Youngberg v. Romeo. Thus, in Garrett v. Rader, the mother of a retarded adult who died in restraints was entitled to bring an action claiming failure to properly hire and train staff and failure to correct conditions that had caused past abuse.

One court has prohibited the restraint of children to a fixed object (see Pena v. New York State Division for Youth). The use of restraints as corporal punishment is unconstitutional under H.C. v. Hewett by Jarrard and Stewart v. Rhodes. Moreover, the use of restraints as a retaliatory device against inmates who displease correctional officers may violate the constitution (see Davidson v. Flynn).

Other courts dealing with the use of mechanical restraints have found that due process is violated unless recommended by a health professional (see Wells v. Franzen and O'Donnell v. Thomas on permitting restraint of a suicidal inmate and Jones v. Thompson on finding that use of three-way restraints on a suicidal inmate for a week, coupled with a failure to provide medical treatment or review and the absence of personal hygiene amenities, was unconstitutional). The U.S. Supreme Court permits the use of antipsychotic drugs as a form of medical restraint only where there is substantial due process protection for the inmate (see Washington v. Harper and Riggins v. Nevada). 

There is some authority that restraints may be used for a limited period to prevent self-injury by a minor under Milonas v. Williams and Gary W. v. State of Louisiana. Such courts have also held that restraints may not be used for longer than 30 minutes without authorization from qualified professionals or institutional administrators (see Gary W. v. State of Louisiana and Pena v. New York Division for Youth). 

Chemical restraints. A few juvenile institutions have begun to use tear gas or pepper spray to restrain children. Although pepper spray alone may not cause death, it may pose serious danger for inmates who suffer from certain health conditions.

Although the use of chemical restraints has seldom been litigated in juvenile cases, at least two cases have found that the use of tear gas and mace on children who were troublesome, uncooperative, or unresponsive to staff violated the constitution (see Morales v. Turman, and State of West Virginia v. Werner). Similarly, Alexander S. v. Boyd found it improper to use tear gas on children to enforce orders.

Isolation. Most institutions use isolation for out-of-control individuals or as punishment for breaking rules. Even though isolation is commonly imposed as a sanction in juvenile institutions, some courts have found that children may be placed in isolation only when they pose immediate threats to themselves or others, that they must be monitored closely, and that they must be released as soon as they have regained control of themselves.

Adult institutional case law on the use of isolation as punishment focuses on arbitrary placement in isolation, the length of time imposed, and conditions in the isolation room (see Harris v. Maloughney, McCray v. Burrell, and Lareau v. MacDougall). The cases, demanding that persons in isolation be afforded humane physical conditions and access to basic necessities such as showers and exercise, also apply to children. Children in isolation should be given books, writing materials, and articles of personal hygiene.

What may be acceptable as punishment for adults may be unacceptable for children. Children have a very different perception of time (5 minutes may seem like an eternity), and their capacity to cope with sensory deprivation is limited. Thus, in Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, a 14-year-old status offender who got into a fight with another girl was placed in isolation in a 6- by 9-foot room for 24 hours a day, for 2 weeks. The court found this isolation to be unconstitutional.

Corporal punishment. The wanton infliction of pain on prisoners violates the eighth amendment under Weems v. United States and Jackson v. Bishop. The use of excessive force by police or custodial officials violates the 14th amendment under Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences and Meade v. Gibbs. Torturing inmates to coerce information from them is also improper (see Cohen v. Coahoma County, Mississippi). Similarly, depriving an inmate of adequate food is a form of corporal punishment (see Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock, Texas).

Due process. A huge body of law governs disciplinary due process in adult institutional cases, mostly in relation to administrative segregation or disciplinary transfers. The leading case, Wolff v. McDonnell, holds that inmates are entitled to these protections whenever "major" discipline is to be imposed (see Baxter v. Palmigiano). There must be evidence to support the finding of the disciplinary board. 

During disciplinary proceedings, inmates are entitled to advance written notice of the charges against them, an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in their defense where permitting them to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, an impartial decisionmaker, a written decision describing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken, and a procedure for appealing the decision (see Hewitt v. Helm, Punte v. Real, and Sandin v. Conner).

Grievance procedures. Grievance procedures are important to children because they provide a means of addressing perceived injustices, and they thereby assist the rehabilitative process. They are also important to institutional administrators, since they provide information about abuses that may be occurring. In cases involving adults, it is clear that the constitutional right to seek redress of grievances is violated if there is any retaliation against the prisoner for filing a grievance (see Dixon v. Brown). Similarly, grievance procedures may not place unreasonable restrictions on the language that may be used in presenting the inmate's complaint under Bradley v. Brown.

Constitutional law specific to grievance procedures for children is limited, but many cases have approved various forms of grievance procedures. The basic elements of adequate procedures are notice to the children of the availability, purpose, and scope of the procedure; a clear and simple procedure for the child to present a grievance to staff; prompt investigation of the grievance; an opportunity for the child to present the grievance to an impartial panel; notice to the child of the panel's decision; appropriate disciplinary sanctions to staff if the grievance is found justified; and written records of the procedure and final action.


Inmates have a right to personal safety under Youngberg v. Romeo, Jackson v. Fort Stanton State Hospital & Training School, Smith v. Wade, Farmer v. Brennan, Ramos v. Lamm, and Harris v. Maynard. A growing body of case law explores the limits of the constitutional right to safety and the liability of institutional officials for the failure to protect vulnerable inmates (see Young v. Quinlan, Redman v. County of San Diego, LaMarca v. Turner, Miller v. Glanz, Luciano v. Galindo, Sampley v. Ruettgers, and Hill v. Shelander).

In Hudson v. McMillan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that minor injuries suffered by a handcuffed, shackled inmate beaten by three Louisiana prison guards constituted a violation of the eighth amendment. The supervisor on duty had watched the beating and told the guards "not to have too much fun." The Court held that in measuring the objective component of a violation of the eighth amendment, courts should be guided by contemporary standards of decency (Wilson v. Seiter) and, when officials act sadistically, those standards are always violated whether significant injury is evident or not (see Felix v. McCarthy on denying qualified immunity to prison guards in connection with an unprovoked attack on an inmate, even though the injury to the inmate was slight, and Valencia v. Wiggins on denying qualified immunity to a jailer who bashed an inmate's head against cell bars and used a choke hold that rendered the inmate unconscious).

It is difficult to say when violence reaches constitutional proportions. A California court ruled in Inmates of Riverside County Jail v. Clark that violence had reached an unacceptable level when there was a one in three chance that an inmate would become a victim of violence. In LaMarca v. Turner, the court examined reports showing that the prison superintendent was aware of the level of violence and the conditions contributing to it without acting to remedy the situation. 

There has been less litigation over safety issues in juvenile facilities, but the same principles apply; facilities must protect children from violence and sexual assault by other children (see Guidry v. Rapides Parish School Board and C.J.W. by and through L.W. v. State). In monitoring safety issues in juvenile institutions, it is crucial to examine reports of violence or potential violence from individuals, the number and characteristics of violent incidents, and the level of fear in the institution. Another safety issue that, fortunately, arises less frequently is staff brutality. There are few cases on this issue, but further research on the use of excessive force would be valuable. 

State Statutes and Juvenile Transfer Laws

During the past decade, most states have adopted legislation that permits the transfer of youth to adult courts to be tried as adults. Usually these laws target serious crimes and permit the age of jurisdiction to be lowered. Relative to the issue of juveniles in adult correctional facilities, these laws often become the basis for a juvenile to be housed in a jail if charged and awaiting court disposition or in a prison if the juvenile has been convicted and sentenced. 

Between 1992 and 1996, 45 states and the District of Columbia made substantive changes to their laws targeting juveniles who commit violent or serious crimes (Torbet et al., 1996). All but 10 states adopted or modified laws making it easier to prosecute juveniles in criminal court. Nearly half of the states (24) added crimes to the list of offenses excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, and 36 states and the District of Columbia excluded certain categories of juveniles from juvenile court jurisdiction. The list of offenses considered serious enough to warrant the transfer of youth as young as age 14 included murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and rape as well as less serious and violent offenses such as aggravated stalking, lewd and lascivious assault or other acts in the presence of a child, sodomy, oral copulation, and violation of drug laws near a school or park. Since 1992, 13 states and the District of Columbia have added or modified statutes that provide for a mandatory minimum term of incarceration for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for certain serious and violent crimes.

A legal method used to try a youth as an adult is accomplished by lowering the age of jurisdiction. For example, seven states (Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, South Carolina, and Texas) set their age of jurisdiction at 16, whereas three (Connecticut, New York, and North Carolina) have lowered the age to 15. Missouri lowered the age for transfer to criminal court to 12 for any felony. In all but two states (Nebraska and New York), a juvenile court judge can waive jurisdiction over a case and transfer youth to the adult court for certain crimes and at certain ages. The number of juvenile court cases transferred to criminal court increased 71 percent between 1985 and 1994 and 42 percent from 1990 to 1994 (Butts, 1996).

Although the legal basis for waiver varies from state to state, the trend across the country is to expand the use of waivers. This expansion is being accomplished by casting wider nets for waiver by lowering the age of adult jurisdiction, by adding to the list of applicable crimes, and by adopting more procedures by which youth can be transferred to adult court (e.g., through the discretion of the prosecutor or through legislative mandate). Waiver provisions are often applied to nonviolent offenders and, in some states, running away from a juvenile institution is grounds for prosecution in adult court (Shauffer et al., 1993).

As part of this study, an updated assessment of current statutes affecting the ability to try a juvenile as an adult is summarized in appendix A. As shown in chapter 3, these laws have fueled the rapid increase in juveniles being housed in adult prisons and jails.

<Go To Chapter 3>                                 <Return To Table of Contents>

Case Law Citations

Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973).

Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977), 570 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1978).

A.J. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 1995).

Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, 978 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1992).

Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773 (D. S.C. 1995).

Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995).

Arey v. Robinson, 819 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1992).

Baker v. Holden, 787 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Utah, 1992).

Balla v. Board of Corrections, 656 F.Supp. 1108 (D. Idaho 1987), 869 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1989).

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 323, 96 S.Ct. 1861, 1877 (1976).

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979).

Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 172-173 (1st Cir. 1986).

Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1991).

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491 (1977).

Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995).

Bradley v. Brown, 911 F. Supp. 446 (D. Or. 1994).

Brock v. Warren County, Tennessee, 713 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).

Buffington v. Baltimore City, 913 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1990).

Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1988).

Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1993).

Cantarino v. Wilson, 546 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Ky. 1982), 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989).

Carver v. Knox County, Tennessee, 753 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).

Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993).

City of Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 381, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989).

C.J.W. by and through L.W. v. State, 853 P.2d 4 (Kan. 1993).

Clay v. Miller, 626 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1980).

Coades v. Jeffes, 822 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1993).

Cohen v. Coahoma County, Mississippi, 805 F. Supp. 398 (N.D. Miss. 1992).

Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).

Colle v. Brazos County, Texas, 981 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1993).

Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock, Texas, 929 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1991).

Corpus v. Estelle, 551 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1977).

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079 (1972).

Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1994).

Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1991).

D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F. Supp. 896, 904 (D. Or. 1982).

Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1994).

Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1994).

Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. N.Y. 1988).

Donnell C. v. Illinois State Board of Education, 829 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1991).

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976).

Facilities Review Panel v. Coe, 420 S.E.2d 532 (W.Va. 1992).

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).

Feliciano v. Colon, 754 F. Supp. 942 (D. P.R. 1991).

Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1991).

Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. N.Y. 1989).

Garrett v. Rader, 831 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1987).

Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1987).

Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).

Gerakeris v. Champagne, 913 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1996).

Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), 471 U.S. 1053, 105 S.Ct. 2114 (1985).

Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1991).

Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991).

Gobel v. Maricopa County, 867 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1989).

Green v. Johnson, 513 F. Supp. 965 (D. Mass. 1981).

Grummet v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1995).

Guidry v. Rapides Parish School Board, 560 So.2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 

Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).

Hall v. Dalton, 34 F.3d 648 (8th Cir. 1994).

Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1992).

Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi, 36 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 1994).

Harris v. Maloughney, 827 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Mont. 1993).

Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1988).

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).

Hayes v. Marriott, 70 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 1995).

H.C. v. Hewett by Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986).

Heflin v. Stewart County, Tennessee, 958 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1992).

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 113 S.Ct. 2475 (1993).

Henderson v. De Robertis, 940 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1991).

Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375, 1379 (10th Cir.) 474 U.S. 844, 106 S.Ct. 131 (1985).

Hewitt v. Helm, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864 (1983).

Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1993).

Hopowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985).

Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992).

Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1369-70  (D. R.I. 1972), Civil No. 4529 (D. R.I. Jan. 15, 1979) (final order).

Inmates of Riverside County Jail v. Clark, 44 Cal. App. 3d 866 (1983).

Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).

Jackson v. Fort Stanton State Hospital & Training School, 757 F. Supp. 1243 (D. N.M. 1990).

Johnson v. Cicone, 260 F. Supp. 553, 556 (E.D. Mo. 1966).

Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981).

Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986).

Jones v. Thompson, 818 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Ind. 1993).

Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).

Keker v. Procunier, 398 F. Supp. 756, 762 (E.D. Cal. 1975).

Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992).

LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992). Lareau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).

Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).

 Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1981).

Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994 (1968).

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996).

Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).

Luciano v. Galindo, 944 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1991).

Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1988).

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).

Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983).

McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991).

McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975).

McKenna v. City of Memphis, 785 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1986).

Meade v. Gibbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988).

Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1991).

Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), 460 U.S. 1096 (1983).

Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1992).

Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976).

Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1992).

Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 174 (E.D. Tex. 1973) 430 U.S. 988 (1977).

Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), 430 U.S. 322, 97 S. Ct. 1189 (1977).

Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).

Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1996).

Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 357 (7th Cir.), 417 U.S. 987 (1974).

Nelson v. Overberg, 999 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1993).

Nick O. v. Terhune, Case No. CIV S-89-0755-RAR-JFM (Stipulation and Order filed Feb. 16, 1990).

O'Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1987).

O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987).

Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of Houston, Texas, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986).

Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1991). 

Pena v. New York State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800 (1974). Punte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 105 S.Ct. 2192 (1985).

Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1993).

Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980), 450 U.S. 1041, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1981).

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991).

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (1992).

Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), (5th Cir. 1982), and 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).

Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1983). Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995).

Santiago v. Miles, 774 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. N.Y. 1991). Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3d Cir. 1991).

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (1983).

Somers v. Thorman, 109 F.3d 614, (9th Cir. 1997).

Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808 (D. D.C. 1973).

Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979).

State of West Virginia v. Werner, 242 S.E.2d 907 (W.Va. 1978).

Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1979).

Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983).

Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992).

Sweet v. South Carolina, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975).

Thomas v. Mears, 474 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989).

Thompson v. Souza, 111F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997).

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (1989).

Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. Pa. 1982). Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986).

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987).

Tyler v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Mo. 1964).

 U.S. v. Janis, 820 F. Supp. 512 (S.D. Cal. 1992).

Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993).

Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1986), 107 S.Ct. 3263 (1987).

Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985).

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990). Watson v. Jones, 980 F.2d 1165 (8th Cir. 1992).

Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1993).

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544 (1910).

Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1974).

Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1261 (7th Cir. 1985).

White v. Morris, 811 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Ohio 1992). Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1991).

Williams v. I.C.C. Committee, 812 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Cal. 1992).

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991). Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980).

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974).

Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections v.  District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634 (D. D.C. 1994).

Woodhouse v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973). Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).

Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 381, 344 F. Supp. 402 (M.D. Ala. 1972).

Young v. Augusta, Georgia, 59 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1995). Young v.

Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1992).

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982).

Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250 (1971).

Zaczek v. Murray, 983 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1992).

This document was prepared by the Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, under grant number 97-DD-BX-0026, awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

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